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I. INTRODUCTION
On March 29, 2001, a Coweta County, Georgia deputy
clocked Victor Harris’ vehicle at 73 miles-per-hour in a 55
mile-per-hour zone.1 The deputy activated his blue lights, but
Harris continued driving.2 The deputy pursued, and Harris
fled at speeds between 70 and 90 miles per hour. During the
pursuit, Harris “stayed in control of his vehicle, utilizing his
blinkers while passing or making turning movements.”3
Deputy Timothy Scott joined the pursuit.4 Harris entered
Peachtree City, slowed down, “activated his blinker, and
turned into a drugstore parking lot located in a shopping
complex . . . [where] Scott proceeded around the opposite side
of the complex in an attempt to prevent Harris from leaving
the parking lot.5 Harris attempted to avoid hitting Scott’s
* J.D., Lincoln Memorial University Duncan School of Law,
December 2020
1 Harris v. Coweta Cty., 406 F.3d 1307, 1311 (11th Cir. 2005).
2 Id.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.
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car, but the two vehicles “came in contact with each other,
causing minor damage to Scott’s cruiser.” Harris entered the
highway and continued his flight.6
Despite having no training in the technique, Scott
requested permission to perform the “PIT maneuver”
(Precision Immobilization Technique). Scott’s supervisor
gave him permission to do so with no knowledge of the
justification for the pursuit, no knowledge of the speeds
involved, and no knowledge of the number of vehicles or
pedestrians on the roadway.7 Scott then determined that he
“could not perform the PIT maneuver because he was going
too fast.”8 Instead he “rammed his cruiser directly into
Harris’ vehicle, causing Harris to lose control, leave the
roadway, run down an embankment, and crash.”9 Harris
sustained serious injuries, rendering him a quadriplegic.10
Harris brought a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim for violation
of his Fourth Amendment right to be free from unreasonable
seizure (i.e. excessive force) “under color of law” against
Deputy Scott and others.11 Scott responded by moving for
dismissal of Harris’ complaint for failure to state a claim as
a matter of law pursuant to Rule 56 of the Federal Rules of
Civil Procedure.12 Scott based this motion on the qualified
immunity doctrine, which provides immunity to claims of
excessive force when the officer has a reasonable, good faith
belief that the force at issue was permissible.13 The Federal
District Court for the Northern District of Georgia denied the
grant of qualified immunity for both Scott and his
supervisor.14 Under procedure permitted for denials of
qualified immunity, Scott entered an interlocutory appeal on

Id.
Id. at 1311-12.
8 Id. at 1312.
9 Id.
10 Id.
11 Id. at 1313.
12 Id. at 1310-12.
13 See David J. Oliveiri, Annotation, Defense of good faith in
action for damages against law enforcement official under 42
U.S.C.A § 1983, providing for liability of person who, under the
color of law, subjects another to deprivation of rights, 61 A.L.R.
Fed. 7.
14 See Scott v. Harris, 550 U.S. 372, 376 (2007).
6
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the issue of qualified immunity.15 The Eleventh Circuit
Court of Appeals reviewed the written record, then affirmed
the denial as to Scott, but reversed the denial (i.e. effectively
granting) as to his supervisor.16 It appears that the case was
going to trial, except that the United States Supreme Court
granted certiorari on Deputy Scott’s interlocutory appeal.17
In the opinion that followed, Justice Antonin Scalia
gave an excoriating opinion admonishing the Eleventh
Circuit and granting Deputy Scott’s motion for summary
judgment based on qualified immunity.18 In doing so, Justice
Scalia stated, “We have little difficulty in concluding it was
reasonable for Scott to take the action that he did.”19 What
can explain this glaring difference in the conclusions (and
underlying analyses) of the District, Circuit, and Supreme
Court?
The Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution guarantees “[t]he right of the people to be
secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against
unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated,
and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by Oath or affirmation, and particularly
describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things
to be seized.”20 This single, deceptively simple sentence
actually consists of three important components: (1) the right
of citizens to be secure in their “persons, houses, papers, and
effects”; (2) against unreasonable searches and seizures (i.e.
the reasonableness requirement); and (3) a requirement that
warrants be “based on probable cause, supported by oath or
affirmation.”21 The following is focused on the second
component – the requirement of reasonableness – as it
relates to the use of force by the police.
The Fourth Amendment has been interpreted to
apply to a law enforcement officer’s use of force against an
individual (e.g. grabbing, tasing, spraying, striking,
strangling, shooting) – a seizure under the Amendment.22
See Harris v. Coweta Cty., 406 F.3d at 1321.
Id.
17 Scott v. Harris, 549 U.S. 991 (2006).
18 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 386.
19 Id. at 384.
20 U.S. Const. amend. IV.
21 See id.
22 See Graham v. Connor, 490 U.S. 386, 388 (1989).
15
16
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This interpretation brings police use of force under federal
purview and makes any police use of force, whether by a
local, state, or federal officer, a potential constitutional
violation.23 Despite this, police officers are privileged to use
such force without violating the U.S. Constitution, so long as
that force is reasonable when considered against the
circumstances in which it was applied.24 The application of
the privilege to use force hinges on a determination of
reasonableness by the court.25 But what is a reasonable use
of force? That which may appear reasonable to some might
be unreasonable to others. By what standard do we judge
reasonableness? Should we consider the police officer’s
intent? Perhaps we should consider what the proverbial
reasonable person would do? Is it even possible to know?
Defining reasonableness has proven difficult. No
constitutional provision, statute, rule, doctrine, or judicial
decision has been shown to adequately formulate a simple
test that accounts for the myriad of circumstances that police
may encounter. The current rules, discussed below, are in a
constant state of flux. Courts vary in their interpretations.
Contradictory doctrines are developed among the various
Circuits and uncertainty abounds. This is to say nothing of
the various state approaches. As a result, law enforcement
agents, agencies, and the public are left largely in the dark
as to when and how much force is legally permissible.26
Added to this milieu of misunderstanding is a muchmaligned and equally misunderstood qualified immunity
doctrine. Most law enforcement use of force jurisprudence is
drawn from summary proceedings – the grant or denial of
qualified immunity – typically held in the course of a 42
U.S.C. § 1983 action.27 Qualified immunity is a defense
generally available to governmental actors engaged in their
respective discretionary functions and is generally offered in

See id.
See id. at 392-99.
25 Id.
26 Matthew McNamara, Legal Corner: Departmental Liability for
Failure-to-Train, POLICE1 (August 1, 2006),
https://www.police1.com/legal/articles/legal-cornerdepartmental-liability-for-failure-to-train-2u9f7FahaUF5Hcrr/.
27 See 88 A.L.R. 2d 1330.
23
24

171

172

8 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2021)

support of a summary judgment motion (Fed. R. Civ. P. 56).28
The doctrine is a recognized exception to our general legal
formula of allowing a jury to make factual determinations.29
As applied to law enforcement in the use of force context, the
defense permits the summary dismissal of excessive force
allegations based on the officer’s reasonable, good faith belief
that the force at issue was permissible.30 Unfortunately, the
summary standards at issue are antiquated, at best. In such
summary proceedings, courts make very limited factual
inquiries and accept the facts “in the light most favorable to
the non-moving party” (i.e. the non-law enforcement
plaintiff), no matter how “rash and improbable” they
appear.31 Thus, the “facts” presented are often just the
plaintiff’s version of the events. As a result, the doctrine
allows patently false claims to proceed to trial, irrespective
of compelling evidence of their falsity.
Conversely, perhaps to compensate for this otherwise
plaintiff-friendly approach, the qualified immunity doctrine
requires that all claims be “well established.”32 As if to
ensure that neither plaintiff nor defendant could reasonably
expect a rational proceeding, pursuant to a recent change in
procedural jurisprudence, judges may choose to forego any
inquiry into the reasonableness of the force at issue. This
procedural change thus allows judges to avoid their
constitutional imperative to establish the precedent that
plaintiffs, officers, agencies, and the public rely upon as
guidance in determining what is reasonable force.33 Recent
empirical evidence indicates that this change in use of force
procedural law disincentives an objective analysis of the use
of force itself, while encouraging over-reliance on the “well
established” requirement - resulting in the dismissal of

FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see WHITNEY K. NOVAK, POLICING THE
POLICE: QUALIFIED IMMUNITY AND CONSIDERATIONS FOR
CONGRESS, 1 (Cong. Res. Serv. 2020); see also 3 Civil Rights
Actions P 10.03 (2020).
29 Fed. R. Civ. P. 38.
30 See 61 A.L.R. Fed. 7; see also Novak, supra note 28 at 1.
31 See 45 A.L.R. Fed. 864.
32 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 572 (1985); Harlow v.
Fitzgerald, 457 U.S. 800, 818 (1982).
33 See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967).
28

DEFINING REASONABLENESS

173

otherwise meritorious claims of excessive force.34 As fewer
substantive rulings are issued, the public and law
enforcement agencies and officers are left largely in the dark
as to the appropriate standard.35
In the void left by this lack of a consistent statement
on the permissible use of force, the public’s suspicion of law
enforcement and government in general grows.36
Increasingly, this distrust plays out in America’s streets,
businesses, and homes. Resistance to legitimate authority is
on the rise – ironically and sadly resulting an increase in use
of force incidents.37 And yet, this need not be the case. In this
modern age of vehicle-mounted and body-worn cameras,
public and private video surveillance systems, and
omnipresent cellular telephones with video-recording
capabilities, it is now possible to review many police use of
force incidents, in slow motion and frame by frame if
necessary. These recordings now make up a part of the
evidentiary record available for review in summary
proceedings.38 Despite this ability, some judges reviewing
the evidentiary record decline to take full advantage of the
possibilities afforded by such recordings and the extent to

See e.g. John C. Jeffries, Jr., Reversing the Order of Battle in
Constitutional Torts, 2009 SUP. CT. REV. 115, 120 (2009).
35 See Daphne Duret and Jessica Priest, Police training cited as
defense in many use of force cases. But experts say it's outdated,
USA TODAY, (Sept. 22, 2020),
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/investigations/2020/09/22/p
olice-use-force-cases-cite-training-defense-itsoutdated/5861668002/.; see also Tim Dees, 15 things cops wish
the public knew about policing, POLICE1, (July 16, 2019),
https://www.police1.com/police-humor/articles/13-things-wewish-the-general-public-knew-about-police-work5g0rb3QhSysBIVal/.
36 See e.g. Farah Stockman, ‘They Have Lost Control’ Why
Minneapolis Burned, N.Y. TIMES, (July 13, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/07/03/us/minneapolis-governmentgeorge-floyd.html.
37 See e.g. Bill Hutchison, Police officers killed surge 28% this year
and some point to civil unrest and those looking to exploit it, ABC
NEWS,(July 22, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/police-officerskilled-surge-28-year-point-civil/story?id=71773405
38 See U.S.C.S. FED. R. CIV. P. 56; see also Scott, 550 U.S. at 37881.
34
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which courts may rely on such evidence is in question.39 The
difficulties described above have been recognized by others,
and no small amount of legal scholarship has been dedicated
to identifying some of the problems with modern use of force
jurisprudence, arguing for radical change, or offering some
significant alternative.40 Rather than any of these, this
article simply aims to inform the discussion and offers some
practical changes aimed at reconciling use of force
procedural law with modern reality. It attempts to inform
the debate and simplify what is, admittedly, a rather
complex concept.
The following work focuses on the category of force
recognized by most of the American public - the force
employed by uniformed officers upon free citizens during the
course of the officers’ regular duties. This article will focus
on federal jurisprudence, in order to provide the broadest,
most accurate, and most applicable information. Ultimately,
any serious research into police use of force must confront
the reasonableness inquiry – which is always at issue in the
use of force analysis. It is at issue in reviewing the
application of force itself – in establishing a constitutional
violation - and it becomes central in any resultant Section
1983 Action and qualified immunity defense. This inquiry is
presented by detailing the modern history of use of force
jurisprudence, presented by three seminal cases (the
substantive law). That history continues to the present as
courts grapple with new technology and techniques –
creating novel questions of law and requiring a continual
readdressing and refining of the reasonableness standard.
The following section describes some major aspects of use of
force litigation (the procedural law) – namely the Section
1983 action and the qualified immunity doctrine. The
substantive and procedural foundation established, the next
section identifies and establishes some problems with the
current legal standard. Finally, this work will use a short
case study to address the major question posed by this
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378-81; see also Jack B. Weinstein, The
Role of Judges in a Government of, by, and for the People: Notes
for the Fifty-Eighth Cardozo Lecture, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1, 12225 (2008).
40 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, Orwell's Vision: Video and
the Future of Civil Rights Enforcement, 68 MD. L. REV. 600, 60710 (2009).
39
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introduction and demonstrate the effects of the two-step
objective reasonableness inquiry and use of judicial video
review on summary judgment proceedings.

II. HISTORY OF USE OF FORCE JURISPRUDENCE (THE
SUBSTANTIVE LAW)
The history of use of force jurisprudence is less than
straight-forward. Rather, our current understanding of
police use of force has evolved, beginning in the 1970s, and
continuing to the present. In fact, it was not immediately
apparent to the courts that police use of force would be
governed by the Fourth Amendment, let alone what
standard would be applied to ensure the Amendment’s
guarantee of reasonableness.41 Below are three seminal
cases that illustrate the court’s evolution and eventual
adoption of an objective reasonableness standard under the
Fourth Amendment.42

A. SUBSTANTIVE DUE PROCESS TEST - JOHNSON V.
GLICK
Johnson v. Glick was an early attempt by the court
to establish a framework for analyzing law enforcement use
of force. Glick illustrates the struggle pre-Connor courts had
in developing the constitutional framework by which law
enforcement use of force could be judged. In Glick, the
plaintiff brought an excessive force claim under 42 U.S.C. §
1983.43 The Second Circuit Court of Appeals considered and
rejected application of the Eighth and Fourth Amendments
to an incident of alleged excessive force involving a
correctional officer and a pre-trial detainee.44 Ultimately, the
court found that neither the Fourth Amendment nor the
Eighth Amendment apply to the facts alleged.45 The court
instead found that the Fourteenth Amendment’s guarantee
of due process of law prohibited the behavior alleged.46 Glick
See discussion infra, Sections II.A, II.B, II.C.
See generally Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-397.
43 Johnson v. Glick, 481 F.2d 1028, 1029 (2d Cir. 1973).
44 See id.
45 Id. at 1032.
46 Id.
41
42
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illustrates the courts use of various factors in weighing the
competing governmental and individual interests, “In
determining whether the constitutional line has been
crossed, a court must look to such factors as the need for the
application of force, the relationship between the need and
the amount of force that was used, the extent of injury
inflicted . . . .”47 Of note, the court found a mens rea
requirement applicable to such an allegation of violation of
due process of law, “whether force was applied in a good faith
effort to maintain or restore discipline or maliciously and
sadistically for the very purpose of causing harm,”48 a
consideration which, oddly, the Supreme Court would reject
in Graham v. Connor.49 Later cases would also find the
Fourth Amendment, rather than the Fourteenth, as the
source of the Constitutional guarantee against unreasonable
force.50 Glick endures, however, in the court’s continued
consideration of competing interests in its inquiry into the
reasonableness of law enforcement use of force.51

B. TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES - TENNESSEE V.
GARNER
In a landmark use of force decision in 1985, the Court
determined that the common law “fleeing felon rule,” as
enacted in Tennessee statute, was an unconstitutional
violation of the Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against
unreasonable seizure.52 On October 3, 1974, Memphis Police
Officers Elton Hymon and Leslie Wright were dispatched to
a prowler call.53 A witness informed them that she heard
glass breaking and that someone was inside an adjacent
house.54 Officer Hymon went behind the house where he
heard a door slam and saw the suspect run across the
backyard.55 The fleeing suspect, later identified as 16-yearId. at 1033.
Id.
49 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397.
50 See Tennessee v. Garner 471 U.S. 1, 20-21 (1985); Graham, 490
U.S. at 397.
51 Garner, 471 U.S. at 9; Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
52 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-21.
53 Id. at 3.
54 Id.
55 Id.
47
48
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old Edward Garner, stopped at a chain-link fence at the edge
of the yard.56 Officer Hymon called out, “police, halt” and took
a few steps toward Garner, who began to climb over the
fence.57 To prevent Garner’s escape from a felony
(aggravated burglary), Hymon fired one shot at the teen,
striking him in the back of the head.58 Edward Garner died
shortly thereafter.59 There was no indication that Garner
was armed during the encounter.60 Officer Hymon, in firing
on the unarmed teen, was acting under the authority
accorded to him at the time by Tennessee Code, which
provided that “If, after notice of the intention to arrest the
defendant, [the defendant] either flee or forcibly resist, the
officer may use all the necessary means to effect the arrest.”61
After addressing several issues at the district court
and court of appeals, including the question of Officer
Hymon’s qualified immunity, the Sixth Circuit found the
statute at issue permitted an unreasonable (and thus
unconstitutional) seizure under the Fourth Amendment.62
Thereupon, the state of Tennessee intervened and appealed
to the United States Supreme Court. The Supreme Court
agreed with the Circuit Court but found only that the statute
at issue was unconstitutional in its application (perhaps out
of respect for federalism and separation of powers).63 The
high court engaged in a Fourth Amendment interest
balancing test, weighing the defendant’s “fundamental
interest in his own life” against the government’s interest in
effective law enforcement (e.g. reduced violence by
encouraging the individual to submit to arrest rather than
flee).64 The court found that the individual’s interest
outweighed the government’s interest, and that the use of
deadly force actually frustrated society’s interest in seeing a
“judicial determination of guilt and punishment.”65 In doing
so, the Court laid down the seminal rule regarding the use of
Id.
Id. at 4.
58 Id.
59 Id.
60 Id.
61 TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (1982).
62 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-21.
63 Id. at 25.
64 Id. at 9.
65 Id.
56
57
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deadly force by law enforcement. That rule requires that
deadly force may be used to prevent escape only:
Where the officer has probable cause to believe
that the suspect poses a threat of serious
physical harm, either to the officer or to others
. . . . [t]hus, if the suspect threatens the officer
with a weapon or there is probable cause to
believe that he has committed a crime
involving the infliction or threatened infliction
of serious physical harm, deadly force may be
used if necessary to prevent escape, and if,
where feasible, some warning has been
given.66
This decision established a rule which still stands and
prompted a statutory change in Tennessee.67 As later cases
will show, the court’s balancing of the government’s interest
against the individual’s interest against unreasonable
seizure will continue to be an important consideration.68
While the Court in Garner employed the Fourth Amendment
as the source of the substantive right not to be shot while
fleeing a non-violent felony, the case did not definitively state
that the Fourth Amendment was the primary source of
substantive rights in non-deadly use of force cases.69 Beyond
identifying the Fourth Amendment as the font for this
substantive right, the case also reaffirmed the “totality of the
circumstances” standard to be considered in the analysis of
reasonableness.70 The Supreme Court would not be long in
providing a more definitive, but complex, framework for
analyzing police use of force – one which retained the
“totality of the circumstances” concept.

Id. at 11-12.
See TENN. CODE ANN. § 40-7-108 (2020); see also 1985 Tenn.
Pub. Acts 359, § 1; 1990 Tenn. Pub. Acts 980, § 19 (abrogating
Tennessee’s fleeing felon statute); compar. TENN. CODE ANN. § 407-108 (1984).
68 See, e.g., Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-99.
69 Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22.
70 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
66
67
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C. OBJECTIVE REASONABLENESS TEST - GRAHAM V.
CONNOR
Clearly, courts have struggled to define the rights
enjoyed by free citizens when encountering police and
struggled with the best means to uphold those rights. The
courts had successfully established a workable framework
for evaluating deadly force incidents, having found
Tennessee’s “fleeing felon” statute invalid in its
application.71 But what of non-deadly force (which makes up
the great bulk of use of force incidents involving law
enforcement)?72 To address this lack of a legal framework,
the Supreme Court crafted a rule that has stood since its
announcement in 1989. The profound effect of that rule
cannot be overstated, and the case itself has been cited over
54,000 times and has been the subject of nearly 1,200 law
review articles.73 Simply put, it is the foundation of the civil
legal system’s modern understanding of police use of force.
In 1984, Dethorne Graham, a severe diabetic, began
to feel the onset of a diabetic “sugar reaction.”74 A friend,
William Berry, drove him to a Charlotte, North Carolina
convenience store to purchase some orange juice to stave off
the reaction.75 Graham entered the store, but upon seeing
the long line of customers waiting to check out, hurriedly
exited the store without making a purchase.76 Graham and
Berry left, intent on reaching Berry’s residence.77 Connor, a
Charlotte Police Department officer, saw Graham hastily
enter and leave the store.78 Connor became suspicious,
followed Berry’s car as it pulled away from the store, then

See Garner, 471 U.S. at 20-22.
See SHELLEY S. HYLAND ET AL., POLICE USE OF NONFATAL
FORCE, 2002-11, 9 (Bureau of Just. Stats. 2015).
73 Lance J. LoRusso, Graham v. Connor: Three decades of
guidance and controversy, POLICE1 (May 23, 2019),
https://www.police1.com/officer-shootings/articles/graham-vconnor-three-decades-of-guidance-and-controversyuqgh9iY6XPGTdHrG/.
74 Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
75 Id.
76 Id. at 388-89.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 389.
71
72
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made an investigative traffic stop.79 During that stop,
Connor “ordered Berry and Graham to wait while he found
out what, if anything, had happened at the convenience
store.”80 When Officer Connor returned to his patrol car to
call for backup assistance, Graham got out of the car, ran
around it twice, and finally sat down on the curb, where he
passed out briefly due to a diabetic reaction.”81
Unfortunately, responding backup officers
mistook Graham’s symptoms for alcohol intoxication.82
These symptoms are quite similar.83 Graham was
handcuffed and placed face-down on Berry’s car.84 During
this ordeal, Berry and Graham repeatedly informed officers
that Graham was diabetic, but they were ignored.85 Graham
was thrown headfirst into a police car.86 During the struggle
with officers, Graham sustained some minor injuries and a
broken foot.87 Shortly thereafter, Connor learned that
Graham had not committed any crime inside the convenience
store. Graham was driven home and released.88
Graham initiated a §1983 action against the involved
officers, claiming excessive use of force during the encounter
in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment.89 The United
States District Court for the Western District of North
Carolina directed the verdict for Connor and the other
officers, finding that the force used by officers “was not
applied maliciously or sadistically for the very purpose of
causing harm,” but rather in a “good faith effort to maintain
or restore order in the face of a potentially explosive
situation” (the standard applied in Glick).90 The Fourth
Id.
Id.
81 Id.
82 Id.
83 Arthur Hsieh, Drunk Versus Diabetes: How Can You Tell?,
EMS1 (July 7, 2020) https://www.ems1.com/emsproducts/ambulance-disposable-supplies/articles/drunk-versusdiabetes-how-can-you-tell-IPqqk8mtnAjBmJFv/
84 Graham, 490 U.S. at 389.
85 Id.
86 Id.
87 Id. at 390.
88 Id. at 389.
89 Id. at 390.
90 Id. at 390-91.
79
80
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Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed. The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari,91 reversed the District
and Circuit, and established the objective reasonableness
analytical framework of the Fourth Amendment that is still
in effect.92
In the following opinion, Chief Justice Rehnquist,
perhaps grasping the enormity of the shift he was
instituting, gave a rather detailed and justified exposition of
the objective reasonableness test that attempts to provide
consistency and certainty while advancing some legal
novelties.93 Rehnquist positively affirmed that the test of
reasonableness for a law enforcement officer’s use of force
“must be judged from the perspective of a reasonable officer
on the scene.”94 This was a departure from the traditional
and recognizable reasonable person standard and sparked no
small amount of controversy.95
The Chief Justice also took the opportunity to clarify
what the standard was not. Rehnquist completely
disregarded the subjective intent component of the Glick
Fourteenth Amendment analysis, stating, “An officer’s evil
intentions will not make a Fourth Amendment violation out
of an objectively reasonable use of force; nor will an officer’s
good intentions make an objectively unreasonable use of
force constitutional.”96 The Chief Justice disregarded the
Glick Due Process Right to be free of excessive force, instead
finding the right at issue under the more-firmly rooted
Fourth Amendment’s guarantee against unreasonable
seizure,
Where, as here, the excessive force claim
arises in the context of an arrest or
investigatory stop of a free citizen, it is most
properly characterized as one invoking the
protections of the Fourth Amendment, which
guarantees citizens the right ‘to be secure in

Id. at 391-92.
Id. at 397-99.
93 See id. at 392-99.
94 Id. at 395 (emphasis added).
95 See LoRusso, supra note 73.
96 Graham, 490 U.S. at 397 (citing Scott v. United States, 436
U.S. 128, 138 (1978)).
91
92
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their persons . . . against unreasonable . . .
seizures . . . . ”97

Rehnquist’s majority opinion went still further in
blurring the analytical distinction between deadly and nondeadly force, proclaiming that all claims “that law
enforcement officers have used excessive force - deadly or not
- in the course of an arrest, investigatory stop, or other
‘seizure’ of a free citizen should be analyzed under the Fourth
Amendment and its ‘reasonableness’ standard, rather than
under a ‘substantive due process’ approach.”98
In rejecting the subjective intent of the officer and
the reasonable person standard, the Court substituted
several factors to be considered in evaluating the
reasonableness of a law enforcement officer’s use of force.
These factors include: “[1] the severity of the crime at issue,
[2] whether the suspect poses an immediate threat to the
safety of the officers or others, and [3] whether [the suspect]
is actively resisting arrest or attempting to evade arrest by
flight.”99 In establishing this three-pronged test the Court
built upon the totality of the circumstances approach
employed in Tennessee v. Garner.100
Frustratingly, the Court did not establish the kind of
bright-line rule that observers might have hoped for.
Instead, the Court found that the test of Fourth Amendment
reasonableness is incapable of precise definition, but
required “careful attention to the facts and circumstances of
each particular case.”101 Given the fact-specific,
individualized rule the court was crafting, it is no surprise
that Chief Justice Rehnquist provided lower courts with an
“interpretive lens” through which to evaluate use of force
cases.102 The court warned that the reasonableness of a law
enforcement officer’s particular use of force “must be judged
from the perspective of a reasonable officer on the scene,

Id. at 394.
Id. at 395.
99 Id. at 396 (citing Garner, 471 U.S. at 8-9).
100 See Garner, 471 U.S. at 9.
101 Graham, 490 U.S. at 396 (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 441 U.S. 520,
559 (1979)).
102RICHARD M. THOMPSON II, POLICE USE OF FORCE: RULES,
REMEDIES, AND REFORMS 5 (Cong. Res. Cent., 2015).
97
98
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rather than with the 20/20 vision of hindsight.”103 In case
there was still a question about the latitude courts were to
allow officers, Chief Justice Rehnquist posited, “The calculus
of reasonableness must embody allowance for the fact that
police officers are often forced to make split-second
judgments - in circumstances that are tense, uncertain, and
rapidly evolving - about the amount of force that is necessary
in a particular situation.”104 Subsequent courts have
struggled to uniformly apply the standard created in Connor
to the myriad of circumstances surrounding use of force
incidents.

III. REFINING REASONABLENESS
Since
the
establishment
of
the
objective
reasonableness standard, judges and justices have
attempted to refine the standard to adequately account for
the myriad of circumstances that officers confront.
Reviewing courts confront novel questions of law brought by
changes in law enforcement equipment and techniques. This
should not come as a surprise, as use of force jurisprudence
is, by its nature, reactive to such changes. Courts operate to
restrict particular types and amounts of force as they are
confronted with them, case by case, rather than proscribing
the types and amounts of force permitted.105 These courts
have adapted the objective reasonableness standard,
identifying new and more precise factors to be considered,
and elaborating upon the three prongs of Graham v. Connor,
while applying the interpretive lens of the reasonable officer
on the scene.106 In so doing, the courts established new
precedent which later courts built upon. The courts employ
the totality of the circumstances concept to describe the
circumstances against which the officer’s use of force is to be
judged. That concept has been interpreted to describe a
multitude of individual factors as applied to the use of force,
including: “the need for the application of force” and its

Graham, 490 U.S. at 396-97 (emphasis added).
Id.
105 See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES
AND POLICIES 45 (6th ed. 2019).
106 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 396.
103
104
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“relationship to the amount of force used,”107 the extent of
any resultant injury,108 and “whether the force was applied
in good faith or maliciously and sadistically.”109 The Third
Circuit, in Sharrar v. Felsing, identified several additional
factors: “the possibility that the persons subject to the police
action are themselves violent or dangerous, the duration of
the action, whether the action takes place in the context of
effecting an arrest, the possibility that the suspect may be
armed, and the number of persons with whom the police
officers must contend at one time.”110 As one might imagine,
this multitude of factors (itself not exhaustive) in no way
simplified the objective reasonableness analysis. Rather, the
courts have repeatedly cautioned that each use of force
encounter requires a fact-based, case-by-case analysis.111
One aspect of this refining process has been the
recognition of reasonable mistakes of fact. The courts have
repeatedly affirmed that officers in the line of duty are to be
granted appropriate leeway; reasonable mistakes are to be
permitted.112 A reasonable mistake can even rise to the use
of deadly force without constituting a Fourth Amendment
violation.113 This is not surprising, given that the force used
by an officer is supposed to be evaluated from the officer's
perspective, without the benefit of hindsight “in recognition
of the fact that officers cannot be expected to respond to
information they did not possess at the time they acted.”114
The permissible mistakes most often relate to reasonable
mistakes of fact, not law. Thus, where the facts as reasonably
believed (or perceived) by the officer would have justified the
use of deadly force, the use of such force, even when the
officer was mistaken as to those facts, may still be justified.
Examples include officer’s shooting of a person after

Jackson v. Sauls, 206 F.3d 1156, 1170 n.18 (11th Cir. 2000).
Id.
109 Moore v. Gwinnett Cty., 967 F.2d 1495, 1498 (11th
Cir.1992) (quoting Leslie v. Ingram, 786 F.2d 1533, 1536 (11th
Cir.1986)).
110 Sharrar v. Felsing, 128 F.3d 810, 822 (3d Cir. 1997).
111 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 383.
112 Milstead v. Kibler, 243 F.3d 157, 165 (4th Cir. 2001).
113 Culosi v. Bullock, 596 F.3d 195, 200-01 (4th Cir. 2010).
114 Melgar ex rel. Melgar v. Greene, 593 F.3d 348, 355 (4th Cir.
2010).
107
108
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mistakenly perceiving him or her brandishing a firearm,115
or shooting a fleeing driver where the officer reasonably but
mistakenly believed the driver backed over another officer.116
But, how is this substantive law actually applied?

IV. PROCEDURAL ASPECTS OF USE OF FORCE LITIGATION
In the United States, the individual’s constitutional
protection against unreasonable or excessive force by police
is found in the Fourth Amendment to the United States
Constitution.117 No discussion of this federal constitutional
protection against such force would be complete without
discussing the actual mechanism for enforcing that
protection. The primary civil action available against the
individual police officer or agency is the Civil Action for
Deprivation of Rights, or more commonly the 'Section 1983
Action', codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1983.118 As an important
defense against these § 1983 Actions, law enforcement
officers and agencies have at their disposal the oft-maligned
and equally misunderstood qualified immunity doctrine. In
the realm of excessive force claims, the § 1983 action and
qualified immunity defense go hand-in-hand.

A. CIVIL ACTION FOR DEPRIVATION OF RIGHTS
42 U.S.C. § 1983 states in relevant part:
Every person who, under color of any statute,
ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any
State or Territory or the District of Columbia,
subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen
of the United States or other person within the
jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by
the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to

See McLenagan v. Karnes, 27 F.3d 1002, 1006-09 (4th Cir.
1994)
116 Wilkinson v. Torres, 610 F.3d 546, 551 (9th Cir. 2010).
117 Graham, 490 U.S. at 394.
118 Act of Apr. 20, 1871, ch. 22, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (formerly codified
as 8 U.S.C. § 43).
115
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the party injured in an action at law, suit in
equity, or other proper proceeding . . . .119

A “person,” under this statute, has been interpreted
to include local governmental entities, including municipal
and county governments. 120 Despite this interpretation, §
1983 does not impose a pure respondeat superior liability;
rather, the plaintiff in a § 1983 action against the
government entity must prove the entity’s liability is
pursuant to some “policy” or “custom” of the entity that
caused the plaintiff's injury.121
To sustain a § 1983 action, under the language of the
statute, the complaint must allege: “(1) that the conduct
complained of was engaged in under color of state law, and
(2) that such conduct subjected the plaintiff to the
deprivation of rights, privileges, and immunities secured by
the Federal Constitution and laws.”122 Specific to the typical
law enforcement excessive force claim,123 where there is little
argument whether the on-duty police officer was acting
under the color of law, the plaintiff’s complaint must allege
“an injury that resulted directly and only from an objectively
unreasonable, excessive use of force.124 Section 1983 does not
create an independent right of action in and of itself, rather
it is a vehicle for asserting a violation of another recognized
right, which may be established under constitutional or
statutory authority.125 Of course, § 1983 was not the only
statute enacted to protect the newly-won freedoms of freed
African Americans. A similar, criminal statute was
established by the 1866 Civil Rights Act, codified at 18
U.S.C. § 242.126 Despite the existence of this separate
statute, § 1983 actions are far more common than § 242
actions in excessive force claims.127 This is not an accident.
42 U.S.C. § 1983.
See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978); see also
Bd. of the Cty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397 (1997).
121 Monell, 436 U.S. at 694; Pembaur v. City of Cincinnati, 475
U.S. 469, 480-81 (1986).
122 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 58 (2020).
123 See 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 72 (2020).
124 See Hogan v. Cunningham, 722 F.3d 725, 734 (5th Cir. 2013).
125 Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 140 (1979).
126 American Bar Association Resolution 301A, 12 (August 2020).
127 Id.
119
120
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Prosecution of the civil § 1983 action, at least compared to
the criminal § 242 action, is much more straight forward.
Whereas 42 U.S.C. §1983 contains no mens rea requirement
and the standard of proof is the preponderance of the
evidence, 18 U.S.C. § 242 has been interpreted to contain a
mens rea element and requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt.128 Importantly, as § 1983 is a civil action, damage
awards (sometimes rather large) are also at stake.

B. THE QUALIFIED IMMUNITY DOCTRINE
To defend against claims of excessive force,
individuals and governmental entities may assert the
defense of qualified immunity. Qualified immunity is a goodfaith defense, analogous to Common Law torts defenses.129
Qualified immunity differs from a per se good faith defense,
however, in that the qualifying grantee must demonstrate
more than a subjective good intention130. Rather, he or she
must also demonstrate the reasonableness of their belief or
conduct leading to the use of force.131 Qualified immunity is
designed to protect government officials who perform
discretionary functions from civil liability “insofar as their
conduct does not violate clearly established statutory or
constitutional rights of which a reasonable person would
have known.”132 And yet, to classify qualified immunity as a
defense conveys a misunderstanding of the doctrine, as it is
less a defense to liability than an immunity from suit.133 As
such, “it is effectively lost if a case is erroneously permitted
to go to trial.”134 While the defense must be affirmatively
asserted, law enforcement officers are generally entitled to
qualified immunity “when an official’s conduct does not
violate clearly established statutory or constitutional rights
See Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91,101-07 (1945);
compare 42 U.S.C. § 1983, with 18 U.S.C. § 242.
129 See Pierson, 386 U.S. at 557 (“We hold that the defense of good
faith and probable cause . . . is also available to [law enforcement]
in the action under § 1983.”).
130 Manfredonia v. Barry, 401 F. Supp. 762, 768 (E.D.N.Y. 1975).
131 61 A.L.R. Fed. 7.
132 Sigley v. City of Parma Heights, 437 F.3d 527, 536 (6th Cir.
2006) (quoting Harlow, 457 U.S. at 817-18).
133 Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511, 526 (1985).
134 Id.
128
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of which a reasonable person would have known.”135 The
defense is most often asserted pursuant to a summary
judgment motion where, if granted, the defense may obviate
the need for a trial.136 It may be appropriate for a judge to
make a determination as to the reasonableness of the
officer’s conduct at issue on summary judgment motion,
either granting or denying in whole or in part the motion, as
the reasonableness of a use of force is a legal determination,
not a pure question of fact.137 Summary judgment based on
qualified immunity is granted when the moving party (law
enforcement defendant) shows that there is no genuine issue
of material fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.138 Courts have emphasized that the
alleged factual dispute must be both genuine and material.139
The grant of qualified immunity at this summary stage, as
in other civil actions, allows the defendant to avoid the time
and expense of an unnecessary trial.140
There are strong policy arguments for granting the
immunity early in the course of litigation, where
appropriate.141 These arguments include avoidance of any
“excessive disruption of government” and the “resolution of
insubstantial claims” by summary judgment.142 Other
arguments include the safeguarding of government funds,
preservation of judicial resources, and eliminating any
disincentive for police officers to carry out their duties.143 In
accord with these purposes, the Supreme Court has
repeatedly stressed the importance of resolving immunity
questions “at the earliest possible stage in litigation.”144
White v. Pauly, 137 S. Ct. 548, 551 (2017).
See FED. R. CIV. P. 56.
137 See Fitzgerald v. Santoro, 707 F.3d 725, 733 (7th Cir. 2013).
138 Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v. Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S.
574, 586-587, (1986); see FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a).
139 Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 247-48 (1986).
140 See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; see also Anderson, 477 U.S. at 248.
141 See Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 526; see also Harlow, 457 U.S. at 819.
142 Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818; 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 102
(2020).
143 See Philip Sheng, An “Objectively Reasonable” Criticism of the
Doctrine of Qualified Immunity in Excessive Force Cases Brought
Under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, 26 BYU J. PUB. L. 99, 100 (2012); see also
Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818-19.
144 Hunter v. Bryant, 502 U.S. 224, 227 (1991).
135
136
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Recognizing that an order to trial irrevocably terminates the
immunity and defeats these public policy goals, courts
permit interlocutory appeal for denials of immunity.145
Despite the policy arguments in support of an early
grant of qualified immunity, several procedural protections
are in place and designed to ensure that meritorious claims
are not unjustifiably dismissed. While the question of the
reasonableness of an officer’s actions are typically reviewed
as a question of law, courts, even in summary proceedings,
typically do not make findings of fact.146 Upon a motion for
summary judgment, including a motion based on qualified
immunity, the judge must view the admissible evidence on
the record “in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party” (the plaintiff).147 This procedural safeguard is
designed to ensure that no case is dismissed where material
facts are in dispute, before the trier of fact can weigh the
evidence through trial. Stated another way, the judge should
grant the motion only if “no reasonable trier of fact could ever
find in the opposing party's favor based on the admissible
evidence in the record.”148 The inquiry is whether the trier of
fact could find in the plaintiff’s favor, not whether a
reasonable trier of fact likely would.149 These procedural
safeguards represent the public policy interest in ensuring
just relief to an afflicted party.
When evaluating a claim to qualified immunity, the
Court’s threshold inquiry is whether the plaintiff's
allegations, when taken as true, establish a constitutional
violation.150 If the plaintiff’s allegations do not establish a
constitutional violation, the inquiry ends.151 If the plaintiff’s
allegations, taken as true, do establish a constitutional
violation, the court must then determine whether the right
at issue was clearly established at the time of the alleged
violation.152 This requirement that the violation be “clearly
established” serves to ensure that officers are “on notice their
Mitchell, 472 U.S. at 527.
Anderson, 477 U.S. at 250.
147 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 380.
148 McIndoe v. Huntington Ingals, 817 F.3d 1170, 1176 (9th Cir.
2016).
149 Id.
150 Hope v. Pelzer, 536 U.S. 730, 736 (2002).
151 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights § 106 (2020).
152 Saucier v. Katz, 533 U.S. 194, 201 (2001).
145
146
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conduct is unlawful.”153 Such a standard purports to protect
officers when they are acting within the “sometimes hazy
border” between justifiable and excessive force.154 The degree
of factual similarity required for the right to be “wellestablished” varies among the lower courts and among the
circuits.155 In all circuits, the degree of similarity “must be
clear enough that every reasonable official would interpret it
to establish the particular rule the plaintiff seeks to
apply.”156

C. PROCEDURAL SUMMARY
In summary, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 does not establish a
stand-alone right; the plaintiff must allege a violation of an
underlying right by the defendant acting “under color of
law.”157 To establish such a violation, the plaintiff must
demonstrate that a reasonable officer, with the facts known
to the officer at the time the force was used, without the
benefit of hindsight, in the given circumstances (totality of
the circumstances), would have known that the right was
clearly established.158 This standard, at least on its face,
permits mistakes so long as they are reasonable.159 In
practice, the officer’s ultimate liability turns on the objective
reasonableness of the force employed assessed against the
clearly established law at the time the force was employed.160
As should be clear from the language in Graham v. Connor
and its progeny, and the language employed to describe the
qualified immunity doctrine, the reasonableness inquiry as
applied to the use of force at issue and the qualified
immunity defense is substantially the same inquiry.161 At
least, that is how the inquiry used to progress.
Unfortunately, a fairly recent procedural change has
Pearson v. Callahan, 555 U.S. 223, 243-44 (2009).
Saucier, 533 U.S. at 206.
155 See Zadeh v. Robinson, 928 F.3d 457, 479 (5th Cir. 2019).
156 District of Columbia v. Wesby, 138 S. Ct. 577, 590 (2018).
157 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
158 See Harlow, 457 U.S. at 818.
159 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 205.
160 Wilson v. Layne, 526 U.S. 603, 614 (1999); Graham, 490 U.S.
at 397.
161 See Sheng, supra note 143, at 108; 15 AM. JUR. 2D Civil Rights
§ 109 (2020).
153
154
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introduced some judicial discretion in applying the
reasonableness inquiry – leading to some unfortunate,
lasting effects.

V. PROBLEMS WITH THE CURRENT SUMMARY JUDGMENT
STANDARD
In determining whether the alleged actions violate
clearly established law, courts employ the same standard
used in evaluating the use of force itself - the objective
reasonableness test.162 Like other civil cases, and despite the
difficulty in compiling accurate nation-wide data, it is
evident the vast majority of excessive force claims do not end
in trial.163 Rather, it is by evaluation of the use of force
analysis performed at the summary judgment stage, as a
question of law, that law enforcement and entity counsel,
officials, and trainers develop agency policy and training
regimes.164 Hence, the importance of the court’s analysis
regarding the use of force cannot be overstated.
Unfortunately, this two-step inquiry, once mandatory, has
recently been abrogated by the Supreme Court. This
loosening of the Court’s procedural requirements has
allowed lower courts to avoid difficult constitutional
questions.165 Coupled with the loosening of the court’s
constitutional imperative, the increasing use of video review
by courts, as the availability of such audio and video evidence
has increased, sparked a reaction among some legal
academics, who argued against extensive judicial review or

See Graham, 490 U.S. at 388.
See Christina Carrega, Millions in Lawsuit Settlements Are
Another Hidden Cost of Police Misconduct, Legal Experts Say,
ABC NEWS, (June 14, 2020), https://abcnews.go.com/US/millionslawsuit-settlements-hidden-cost-police-misconductlegal/story?id=70999540; see also KENNETH ADAMS ET AL., USE OF
FORCE BY POLICE: OVERVIEW OF NATIONAL AND LOCAL DATA 10
(U.S. Dep't. of Just., Off. of Just. Programs 1999); John Barkai et
al., A Profile of Settlement, 42 CT. REV. Iss. 3-4, 2-3 (2006).
164 See Duret and Pri, supra note 35.
165 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35; see also Aaron L. Nielson &
Christopher J. Walker, The New Qualified Immunity, 89 S. CAL.
L. REV. 1, 5 (2015).
162
163
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reliance on such evidence.166 The legitimacy of judicial video
and audio review has been called into question, and the
degree to which individual judges are taking advantage of
this evidence varies.167 These two recent developments have
led to a situation in which courts variably rule only on the
facts as presented by the plaintiff, to the exclusion of more
reliable audio-video evidence, or else skip to the “wellestablished” prong of the analysis – avoiding the objective
reasonableness analysis altogether. In either eventuality,
courts are producing less and less-useful excessive force
precedence – contrary to the needs of future courts, law
enforcement, and the public.

A. ELIMINATION OF THE SAUCIER MANDATE
In the 2009 Pearson v. Callahan ruling, in response
to criticism and complaints from lower courts and other
interested parties, the Supreme Court held that the
identification of a constitutional violation, with its necessary
objective reasonableness test, while often “appropriate,” was
no longer to be regarded as mandatory.168 This change
allowed courts to avoid the determination of a constitutional
violation and skip to the determination of whether the
purported right was well-established – effectively
shortcutting the whole objective reasonableness analysis of
the force at issue.169 Since the elimination of the two-step
inquiry (Saucier) requirement, many courts have elected to
forego the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis in
favor of simply considering whether the alleged excessive
force violated “clearly established law.”170 This result was
foreseeable and was actually predicted by a number of legal
scholars.171 This forgoing of the two-step Saucier analysis
has produced some troubling results.172 Among them, the
See, e.g., Howard Wasserman, Mixed Signals on Summary
Judgment, 2014 MICH. ST. L. REV. 1331, 1337-40 (2014).
167 Compare Mullenix v. Luna, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), with Luna v.
Mullenix, 773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversed and remanded).
168 See Pearson, 555 U.S. at 234-35.
169 See id. at 236.
170 Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479-80.
171 See, e.g., Jeffries, supra note 34, at 120.
172 See How Ziglar v. Abbasi Sheds Light on Qualified-Immunity
Doctrine, 96 WASH. U. L. REV. 883, 890 (2019).
166
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avoidance of the “knotty constitutional inquiry” has led to
“constitutional stagnation.”173 This stagnation is perhaps
more pronounced due to the discretion permitted by
Callahan. Courts predominantly continue to make legal
findings regarding the reasonableness of a particular use of
force in obvious cases.174 In contrast, courts tend to forego
this discretionary analysis when confronted with the most
difficult legal questions, a trend which is supported by the
post-Callahan empirical data.175 Stated another way, it
would appear that the discretion afforded by the abrogation
of the Saucier two-step analysis has resulted in courts
avoiding the close legal calls – the cases where judicial
interpretation is needed most.176 As fewer courts undertake
the reasonableness inquiry in difficult cases, less applicable
case law is issued by those same courts; later courts then lack
the necessary precedent to determine whether a right is “well
established.”177 Constitutional questions are allowed to go
unanswered because they were unanswered before, This
foreseeable result has been aptly described as “Section 1983
meets Catch-22.”178
Some of the arguments advanced for abrogating the
Saucier requirement are legitimate, but these complaints
pale in comparison to the very real danger of constitutional
stagnation. Strictly speaking, Saucier did require courts to
confront a constitutional issue where it might otherwise be
avoided, running contrary to the court’s long-held policy of
constitutional avoidance.179 Yet, it’s academic folly,
bordering on the ridiculous, to argue that courts should
practice constitutional avoidance when evaluating excessive
force claims – which are based on the Fourth Amendment to

Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 479-80; see Nielson & Walker, supra note
165, at 4-7.
174 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 165, at 6.
175 See id.
176 See Aaron L. Nielson & Christopher J. Walker, Strategic
Immunity, 66 EMORY L.J. 55, 67 (2016).
177 See Zadeh, 928 F.3d at 464.
178 Id. at 479-80; see Reichle v. Howards, 566 U.S. 658, 664 (2012).
179 See Ashwander v. TVA, 297 U.S. 288, 347 (1936); see also
Pierre N. Level, Madison Lecture: Judging Under the
Constitution: Dicta about Dicta, 81 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1249, 1276-77
(2006).
173

193
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the United States Constitution.180 Also, Saucier did require
courts to expend judicial resources where it was not strictly
necessary – at least as to the necessity of the analysis in the
case before it.181 This argument against the expenditure of
judicial resources is diminished when the results of foregoing
the analysis, now supported by a decade of post-Callahan
cases, is the avoidance of close constitutional questions – the
cases in which an objective reasonableness analysis is most
needed.182 The long-term nature of this stagnation – lack of
precedent compounded further by lack of precedent – is such
that as this avoidance continues, the void in constitutional
precedent grows ever wider.
But what should the courts do about this unfortunate,
but rather predictable, result? That answer is simple –
reinstitute the two-step reasonableness inquiry which was,
until recently, mandatory under Saucier.183 This return to
pre-2009 procedural requirements would force courts to
address the difficult constitutional questions and begin to
address the widening precedential black hole that has been
developing since Pearson v. Callahan. Put simply, require
the courts to fulfill their constitutional duty by evaluating
the specific use of force incidents presented to them.

B. UNCERTAINTY OF VIDEO REVIEW
Even righting the court’s error in abrogating the twostep analysis requirement will only return use of force
jurisprudence to the status quo ante pre-Callahan. It would
do nothing to update or modernize that jurisprudence which,
as explained above, was developed in the 1970’s and 1980’s.
The procedural underpinning of that jurisprudence is
currently in a state of transition, as the courts and legal
system grapple with the appropriate place of judicial audio

42 U.S.C. § 1983; see David B. Owens, Fourth Amendment
Remedial Equilibration: A Comment on Herring v. United States
and Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 563, 583 (2010).
181 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 387-88 (Breyer, J., concurring).
182 See Nielson & Walker, supra note 165, at 6.
183 Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
180
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and video review.184 Judicial decisions since Scott v. Harris
evidence this struggle, as decisions demonstrate varying
degrees of reliance on available recorded evidence.185 In
2007, a major change occurred in procedural jurisprudence
in this regard. Like many use of force cases, the courts were
reviewing an alleged excessive force claim under the Fourth
Amendment, before them on the defendant’s interlocutory
appeal of the lower court's denial of qualified immunity.
Unlike the vast majority of these cases, however, this case
came under the review of the Supreme Court. Since that
decision, described in detail below, legal commentators and
some lower courts have taken the Court’s holding as a
mandate to allow video evidence to “speak for itself,”186 The
reaction to this perceived mandate was strong and
immediate. Legal comments and articles flooded the
discourse, arguing against any reliance on the reviewing
judge’s perception of the recorded incident.187 Some, perhaps
due to the lack of empirical data from legal sources, sought
support from film studies.188 Many of these works raise the
specter of cognitive bias altering the reviewing judge’s
perspective of the incident during video review.189 While such
bias should certainly not be wholly dismissed, concerns over
such bias should not be afforded such weight as to preclude
review of evidence as valuable and reliable as audio-visual
recordings. Rather, recent cases demonstrate that the legal
system is more than capable of affording video and audio
evidence its proper weight.190
Furthermore, any of these commentaries were
premature, as the bulk of these critical works appear to take
for granted that the review of such video evidence by judges
See, e.g., Denise K. Berry, Snap Judgment: Recognizing the
Propriety and Pitfalls of Direct Judicial Review of Audiovisual
Evidence at Summary Judgment, 83 FORDHAM L. REV. 3343,
3377-80 (2015).
185 Compare Mullenix, 577 U.S. 7 (2015), with Luna v. Mullenix,
773 F.3d 712 (5th Cir. 2014) (reversed and remanded).
186 See Wasserman, supra note 166, at 1336-38.
187 See id.
188 See id.
189 See id.
190 See Mitch Zanoff, Assessing the Impact of Police Body Camera
Evidence on the Litigation of Excessive Force Cases, 54 GA. L. REV.
1, 59 (2019).
184

195

196

8 LMU LAW REVIEW 2 (2021)

would unjustly work against the plaintiff in civil rights cases.
Now, more than a decade after the Scott decision, empiricalbased research demonstrates the opposite – the availability
of audio video evidence for review actually aids the
meritorious case in overcoming some of the procedural
hurdles described above.191 The availability and
admissibility of such evidence bodes well for the excessive
force plaintiff’s chance of ultimate recovery.192 Given the
goals of the qualified immunity and the procedural summary
safeguards designed to counterbalance the doctrine, judges
and justices should take full advantage of audio and video
review to afford the procedural justice that interested parties
should expect in our world of omnipresent recording. Beyond
implementation in the courtroom, recent research
demonstrates overall positive outcomes for law enforcement
and the public when audio and video recording technologies
are employed by officers on the street.193 Overall, when
cameras are introduced, use of force incidents go down and
positive police-citizen encounters go up.194 To align Fourth
Amendment procedural doctrine with the justified
expectations of the public,195 and the legitimate needs of law
enforcement,196 the courts should consider making full use of
available audio and video graphic evidence on review,
consistent with the purpose of summary judgment.197 The

See id.
See id. at 5; see also Greg Sobolski & Matt Steinberg, An
Empirical Analysis of Section 1983 Qualified Immunity Actions
and Implications of Pearson v. Callahan, 62 STAN. L. REV. 523,
525, 556 (2010).
193 ANTHONY BRAGA ET. AL., THE BENEFITS OF BODY-WORN
CAMERAS: NEW FINDINGS FROM A RANDOMIZED CONTROLLED TRIAL
AT THE LAS VEGAS METROPOLITAN POLICE DEPARTMENT, 50-51
(U.S. Dep't. of Just., Off. Of Just. Programs 2017).
194 Id.
195 See, e.g., Wasserman, supra note 40, at 611.
196 See Kami N. Chavis, Body-Worn Cameras: Exploring the
Unintentional Consequences of Technological Advances and
Ensuring a Role for Community Consultation, 51 WAKE FOREST L.
REV. 985, 102-03 (2016); see also Braga, supra 193, at 50-3.
197 See FED. R. CIV. P. 56 advisory committee's note (1963
amendment) (“The very mission of the summary judgment
procedure is to pierce the pleadings and to assess the proof in
order to see whether there is a genuine need for trial).
191
192
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arguments for and against audio-video review aside, what is
the effect of such a review in practice?

VI. THE POWER OF VIDEO AND THE MANDATORY TWOSTEP INQUIRY – SCOTT V. HARRIS
The introduction to this article posed the question of
what can explain the glaring difference between the
conclusions and analyses of the District, Circuit, and
Supreme Court regarding the reasonableness of Deputy
Timothy Scott’s decision to force Victor Harris’ car off the
roadway – severely injuring him. The short answer to that
question – the video. Deputy Scott submitted his “dashcam”
(dashboard mounted camera) video containing the entirety
of his involvement in the pursuit and seizure at issue.198 The
nine justices of the Supreme Court, unlike the judges at the
Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals and the Northern District
of Georgia, actually watched the video.199 The eight-to-one
decision that followed illustrates the power and the utility of
video evidence in analyzing law enforcement use of force. The
video review, of course, did not alter the result of the pursuit.
Deputy Scott did end the pursuit by “applying his push
bumper to the rear of the vehicle, causing it to leave the road
and crash.”200 Harris was rendered quadriplegic in the
ensuing crash.201 Deputy Scott never disputed his actions or
Harris’ injuries202 What the review of the video did, for the
Justices, was provide the context against which the objective
reasonableness of Scott’s actions in using deadly force on a
fleeing motorist could be judged.
Justice Scalia begins his analysis by applying the
tried-and-true two-step Saucier summary judgment
analysis. In so doing, Justice Scalia recognized the
importance of the extra judicial step in establishing
precedent.203 Justice Scalia acknowledged that the two-step
inquiry contradicted the Court’s usual policy of avoiding
unnecessary adjudication, but recognized the importance of
See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
Id. at 380-81.
200 Id. at 375.
201 Id.
202 See id. at 376.
203 See id. at 377.
198
199
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the practice as necessary in establishing the precedent that
would become the basis for future holdings dependent on a
right’s clear establishment.204 Justice Scalia affirmed that in
questions of qualified immunity courts must first resolve the
threshold question: whether or not the facts alleged, “taken
in the light most favorable to the party asserting the injury,”
establish a constitutional violation.205 At this threshold
inquiry, the Supreme Court’s inquiry took a marked turn
from the lower courts’ analyses, and the power and utility of
judicial video review becomes clear.
Under modern use of force jurisprudence, the
question of a constitutional violation must be evaluated
based on the objective reasonableness of the officer’s
actions.206 This is necessarily a fact-driven analysis.207 Thus,
it is no surprise that Justice Scalia’s analysis turns to the
relevant facts. The material facts of the pursuit were
contested, as Scott and Harris gave wildly different accounts
of the incident.208 Recognizing that no factual findings had
been conducted, the Justice, consistent with precedent,
acknowledged that in such a case courts are required to “view
the facts and draw reasonable inferences in the light most
favorable” to the non-moving party - usually the plaintiff.209
At this juncture, however, Justice Scalia’s analysis makes a
radical departure from those of the lower courts.
That departure was prompted by the “added wrinkle”
of a videotape of the pursuit in the record of the case.210 Here,
eight of the nine Justices, unlike the judges of the lower
courts, apparently took the opportunity to view the events as
they unfolded, at least to the extent possible, from an
unbiased source.211 The justices found that the dashcam
video tape “clearly contradict[ed] the version of the story told
Id. (quoting Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201).
Id.
206 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-99.
207 Id. at 396; Scott, 550 U.S. at 383 (“[W]e must still slosh our
way through the factbound morass of 'reasonableness'”).
208 See Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
209 Id. at 378 (quoting United States v. Diebold, Inc., 369 U.S. 654,
655 (1962)); see also Saucier, 533 U.S. at 201.
210 Scott, 550 U.S. at 378.
211 Id. (“There are no allegations or indications that this videotape
was doctored or altered in any way, nor any contention that what
it depicts differs from what actually happened.”).
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by respondent and adopted by the Court of Appeals.”212 But
what were the justices to do with this evidence? Should they
have, as offered by some, ignored the evidence before their
eyes? Should they have affirmed the lower courts’ denial of
qualified immunity to Deputy Scott (who, based on the video,
had done nothing wrong), and allowed the case to proceed to
a trial or settlement for a plaintiff who was clearly
misrepresenting the facts of the case?
No. Instead, Justice Scalia, joined by seven of the
remaining eight justices, chose to cut to the heart of the Rule
56 presumption in favor of the plaintiff - that the “facts must
be viewed in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party
only if there is a ‘genuine’ dispute as to those facts.”213
Emphasizing this standard, the majority determined that
“When opposing parties tell two different stories, one of
which is blatantly contradicted by the record, so that no
reasonable jury could believe it, a court should not adopt that
version of the facts for purposes of ruling on a motion for
summary judgment.”214 Instead, this Court based its
determination on the video evidence before them. Based on
that evidence, the Court found the respondent’s account to
be “utterly discredited by the record,” and evaluated the facts
of the case as presented by the dashcam recording, rather
than simply accepting Harris’ account.215 True to precedent,
the Court then turned to the inescapable paradigm - the
objective reasonableness analysis – “in the end we must still
slosh our way through the factbound [sic] morass of
‘reasonableness.’”216
The majority turned to the recurring Fourth
Amendment balancing of the individual’s interest against
the government’s interests.217 The Court, again using the
video evidence at its disposal, identified the “paramount
government interest in ensuring public safety.”218 The Court
Id.
Id. at 380 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 56(a) (“The court shall grant
summary judgment if the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.”).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 Id.
217 Id.; see also United States v. Place, 462 U.S. 696, 703 (1983).
218 Scott, 550 U.S. at 383.
212
213
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weighed the risk that Harris' actions posed to the public
(governmental interest) against the threat that Scott’s
actions posed to Harris (individual’s interest). The court
found that “it is clear from the videotape that respondent
[Harris] posed an actual and imminent threat to the lives of
any pedestrians who might have been present, to other
civilian motorists, and to the officers involved in the chase,”
while recognizing that Scott’s actions “posed a high
likelihood of serious injury or death” to Harris.219 To resolve
this less-than-obvious balance of competing interests,
Justice Scalia found it “appropriate” to consider more than
the number of lives at risked, but also Scott’s and Harris’
relative culpability.220 With this consideration and the video
evidence before them, the Court’s conclusion was
predictable. The majority found that Harris’ actions
“produced the choice between two evils that Scott
confronted,” citing: (1) Harris’ choice to engage in and
continue his “reckless, high-speed flight;” (2) which
continued over the course of nearly ten miles; and (3) his
placing innocent motorists and pedestrians in imminent
danger of death or serious injury. 221 Rejecting the plaintiff’s
now-discredited claim of being a “cautious and controlled
driver” over the course of the pursuit, Justice Scalia
characterized the plaintiff’s flight as something resembling
“a Hollywood-style car chase of the most frightening sort.”222
Based on this balancing of interests, and considering Harris’
own culpability, the Court had “little difficulty” in
determining that Scott’s decision to force Harris off the
roadway to end the pursuit was reasonable.223 Finding
Deputy Scott’s actions objectively reasonable, the Supreme
Court reversed the lower courts and granted Deputy Scott’s
motion for summary judgment based on qualified
immunity.224
Scott is an excellent example of the power of video.
One aspect of that power is the ability of video to place the
reviewing court, at least to some extent, “in the shoes” of the
officer in a way that a police report, affidavit, deposition, or
Id. at 385.
Id.
221 Id. at 384.
222 Id. at 380.
223 Id. at 384
224 Id. at 385.
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even trial testimony simply cannot. That ability is on display
in Justice Scalia’s majority opinion, but is even more
apparent in Justice Breyer’s concurrence, wherein the
Justice unequivocally stated, “Because watching the video
footage of the car chase made a difference to my own view of
the case, I suggest that the interested reader take advantage
of the link in the Court's opinion . . . and watch it.”225 Having
done so, Justice Breyer also found that no reasonable jury
could find that the deputy violated the Constitution.226 That
same ability allows the reviewer to see and appreciate what
the officer sees –the defendant/plaintiff’s culpability. It is
perhaps this element that ultimately tipped the balance in
Deputy Scott’s favor as, based on the majority’s opinion,
Harris’ culpability was their final consideration before
finding Deputy Scott’s actions reasonable.227

VII. CONCLUSION
Yet, this impact of the video aside, it is important to
note that Scott did not create a real change in legal
precedent, nor did the Court rely on some novel legal
analysis to arrive at the conclusion that Deputy Scott acted
reasonably.228 Conversely, the Court relied on the wellestablished objective reasonableness test established in
Graham v. Connor.229 Justice Scalia even rejected plaintiff’s
attempt to craft a new rule, “Garner did not establish a
magical on/off switch that triggers rigid preconditions
whenever an officer's actions constitute ‘deadly force,’”230
finding, as previous courts had, that law enforcement use of
force, even deadly force, is to be analyzed under the
reasonableness test of the Fourth Amendment.231
The holding in Scott provided a much-needed degree
of certainty to the lower courts, law enforcement, and the
public. The Court did so by applying the Saucier two-step
reasonableness inquiry, and by taking full advantage of the
Id. at 387.
Id. at 387.
227 See id. at 384.
228 See id.
229 See Graham, 490 U.S. at 392-99.
230 Scott, 550 U.S. at 382
231 Id.
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unbiased evidence available to it, rather than eschewing the
opportunity to review the video.232 As video recording
technology continues to be implemented by law enforcement
agencies across the country, the resultant empirical data
supports that the judicial review of captured video and audio
has a desirable effect – genuine claims of excessive force are
proven in higher numbers while fraudulent claims are
dismissed earlier in the course of litigation. In this way,
video review furthers the goals of the qualified immunity
doctrine while aiding the meritorious plaintiff in overcoming
some of its procedural barriers to recovery. Finally, in some
circumstances, video review allows the courts to establish
factual elements which would otherwise be unknown and
unknowable. As a result, these reviewing courts can
establish and refine excessive force jurisprudence in a
meaningful way – based on the events that actually occur,
untainted by the bias of the interested parties, while
continuing to apply the same well-established objective
reasonableness standard. Given the possibilities afforded
when video review is available, the now-evident negative
consequences of Callahan’s abrogation of the oncemandatory
two-step
reasonableness
inquiry,
the
consequential dearth of meaningful excessive force case law,
and the resultant uncertainty among lower courts, law
enforcement, and the public, it becomes obvious that the
Saucier mandatory two-step reasonableness analysis should
be reinstituted. The courts should do what society needs and
expects them to do, rule on important constitutional
questions and provide the guidance that future courts, law
enforcement, and the public require. Finally, in the spirit of
Scott, it is appropriate to include a link to the infamous video
so that the interested reader (or watcher) might judge
Deputy Scott’s and Victor Harris’ actions for themselves.233

If anything can truly be said to be “mandatory” for the
Supreme Court.
233 Scott v Harris (USSC 05-1631) Pursuit Video, YOUTUBE (Sept.
3, 2008), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=qrVKSgRZ2GY.
232

